Due to the attention of my last two posts on the use of scientific racism by scholars credited with historical contributions to the discipline of sociology, it is good to note that sociologists were among those involved in UNESCO's statement on The Race Question in 1950 which showed the poverty of the pseudoscience of racism.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Race_Question
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001282/128291eo.pdf
Wednesday, February 25, 2009
Tuesday, February 24, 2009
Salvaging Durkhiem
Durkheim, Mechanical and Organic Solidarity, and ‘Scientific’ Racism
Isaac Christiansen
Upon reading “The Division of Labor in Society” by Emile Durkheim, the incorporation of ‘scientific racism’ of the era in this work deserves to be analyzed if it takes away from the principals of mechanical and organic solidarity, along with if those principals are connected or if they form a fundamental place in Durkheim’s thought. First let us bring to light the particular sections in which the use of ‘scientific’ racism is present.
Durkheim quotes the notorious Dr. Lebon’s work on the sizes of craniums of different peoples and a supposed connection between their cranium size and their level of evolutionary development and connecting this to the principal that the more an organism evolves the more heterogeneous it becomes, thus indicating that the indigenous communities, (being noted for a less developed division of labour and dominance of mechanical solidarity) were less evolved than the European ones (p19 & p89-90). He also indicates that within these societies the individuals do not differ significantly from one another (either physiologically or in any other way) citing slave traders who cared to know only the ethnicity of the individual, for all other essential traits (for their line of ‘business’) were irrelevant- and significant differentiation non-existent (p89-90). He also claims that this is notable in women, that in advanced, industrial societies the women have been removed from the duties of war and political life and their “brain has developed differently”, and in the ‘primitive’ ‘savage’ societies there is little distinction between the sexes, thus less division of labor, and less advanced on the ladder of humanity a particular group finds themselves (pp.19-21). Currently, the social and physical sciences wholeheartedly reject the ideas of pseudo-scientific racism, like Dr. Lebon’s, to the point of not only stating that not only do we not have superior or inferior races, but races themselves do not exist amongst human beings, save as a social construct (Feagin and Feagin, 1996).
However, we find some discrepancy with the above racist postulations in Durkheim’s work itself (albeit not as much as we may like). First, these postulations assume the evolution of organisms and society in a strictly teleological and linear sense, always moving from ‘inferior’ to ‘superior’ development. However, Durkheim’s critique of anomie, and dislike of cities, shows that he had some reservations on the matter. Is it possible to separate Durkheim’s contribution, which was social and not biological in nature, from both the ethnocentricity and scientific racism of the world which surrounded him and which he drew from in this work?
If we do not separate the bulk of Durkheim’s work from the odious nature of social Darwinism, we run the risk of throwing the baby out with the bathwater. It is, however, a sign of progress that what once did not offend, now does, but we still may benefit from the main concepts of the division of labor, and mechanical and organic solidarity. We can understand, without being racists, that there are and have been smaller self-sustaining groups with less of a division of labour out of necessity that had everything to do with social and economic realities and nothing to do with supposed biological ones. While it was necessary to point out the error for it now offends our collective consciousness to some degree, the concepts provide such utility that they can be applied even in this instance.
So let us distinguish the idea that the function of retributive punishment of a crime is not to serve the offender, but the honest people by helping by reestablishing and defining their cohesion, and “healing the wounds of the collective sentiments” (p.63). The concept of organic solidarity and the further development of mutual interdependence in associational societies is perhaps his most interesting and significant contribution. The concept is important as well to socialists, who once involved in the construction of a new society, seek to affirm mans interdependence, for if one piece of the chain is missing it effects all other parts of those on the chain. The idea of solidarity based on difference as we as likeness is a valuable contribution to the social sciences that merits retention.
Although, not recognized within Durkheim’s work here, much of Europe’s development was due to entire sections of labour being forcibly imposed upon indigenous peoples, which freed a section of Europeans from those tasks, as well as enriching it in raw materials and value-added congealed labor. Thus, although not able to be fully developed here, the indigenous and colonized exploited as well as the exploitation of the European proletariats contributed invaluably to the division of labor analyzed here.
Whereas, I find his analysis of indigenous societies, which drew upon the anthropological sources of the time- perfunctory, it may be said that the perfunctory character of the analysis was due to the shallow and colonialist serving nature of the anthropological work of the era, from which this part of his analysis was based; his analysis of organic solidarity as well as the innovative method of analyzing both through respective legal systems remains a significant contribution. Thus, we must as social scientists develop a method of separating and retaining the ideas that are valuable from those that we might wish never existed.
References
Durkheim, Emile. 1933. 1984. “The Division of Labor in Society” The Free Press. New York NY
Feagin, Joe and Feagin, Clairece. 1996. “Racial and Ethnic Relations” Fifth Edition. Prentice Hall. Upper Saddle, New Jersey.
Interesting info on Charles Darwin and social darwinism: http://www.racismreview.com/blog/2009/02/12/charles-darwin-did-he-help-create-scientific-racism/
Isaac Christiansen
Upon reading “The Division of Labor in Society” by Emile Durkheim, the incorporation of ‘scientific racism’ of the era in this work deserves to be analyzed if it takes away from the principals of mechanical and organic solidarity, along with if those principals are connected or if they form a fundamental place in Durkheim’s thought. First let us bring to light the particular sections in which the use of ‘scientific’ racism is present.
Durkheim quotes the notorious Dr. Lebon’s work on the sizes of craniums of different peoples and a supposed connection between their cranium size and their level of evolutionary development and connecting this to the principal that the more an organism evolves the more heterogeneous it becomes, thus indicating that the indigenous communities, (being noted for a less developed division of labour and dominance of mechanical solidarity) were less evolved than the European ones (p19 & p89-90). He also indicates that within these societies the individuals do not differ significantly from one another (either physiologically or in any other way) citing slave traders who cared to know only the ethnicity of the individual, for all other essential traits (for their line of ‘business’) were irrelevant- and significant differentiation non-existent (p89-90). He also claims that this is notable in women, that in advanced, industrial societies the women have been removed from the duties of war and political life and their “brain has developed differently”, and in the ‘primitive’ ‘savage’ societies there is little distinction between the sexes, thus less division of labor, and less advanced on the ladder of humanity a particular group finds themselves (pp.19-21). Currently, the social and physical sciences wholeheartedly reject the ideas of pseudo-scientific racism, like Dr. Lebon’s, to the point of not only stating that not only do we not have superior or inferior races, but races themselves do not exist amongst human beings, save as a social construct (Feagin and Feagin, 1996).
However, we find some discrepancy with the above racist postulations in Durkheim’s work itself (albeit not as much as we may like). First, these postulations assume the evolution of organisms and society in a strictly teleological and linear sense, always moving from ‘inferior’ to ‘superior’ development. However, Durkheim’s critique of anomie, and dislike of cities, shows that he had some reservations on the matter. Is it possible to separate Durkheim’s contribution, which was social and not biological in nature, from both the ethnocentricity and scientific racism of the world which surrounded him and which he drew from in this work?
If we do not separate the bulk of Durkheim’s work from the odious nature of social Darwinism, we run the risk of throwing the baby out with the bathwater. It is, however, a sign of progress that what once did not offend, now does, but we still may benefit from the main concepts of the division of labor, and mechanical and organic solidarity. We can understand, without being racists, that there are and have been smaller self-sustaining groups with less of a division of labour out of necessity that had everything to do with social and economic realities and nothing to do with supposed biological ones. While it was necessary to point out the error for it now offends our collective consciousness to some degree, the concepts provide such utility that they can be applied even in this instance.
So let us distinguish the idea that the function of retributive punishment of a crime is not to serve the offender, but the honest people by helping by reestablishing and defining their cohesion, and “healing the wounds of the collective sentiments” (p.63). The concept of organic solidarity and the further development of mutual interdependence in associational societies is perhaps his most interesting and significant contribution. The concept is important as well to socialists, who once involved in the construction of a new society, seek to affirm mans interdependence, for if one piece of the chain is missing it effects all other parts of those on the chain. The idea of solidarity based on difference as we as likeness is a valuable contribution to the social sciences that merits retention.
Although, not recognized within Durkheim’s work here, much of Europe’s development was due to entire sections of labour being forcibly imposed upon indigenous peoples, which freed a section of Europeans from those tasks, as well as enriching it in raw materials and value-added congealed labor. Thus, although not able to be fully developed here, the indigenous and colonized exploited as well as the exploitation of the European proletariats contributed invaluably to the division of labor analyzed here.
Whereas, I find his analysis of indigenous societies, which drew upon the anthropological sources of the time- perfunctory, it may be said that the perfunctory character of the analysis was due to the shallow and colonialist serving nature of the anthropological work of the era, from which this part of his analysis was based; his analysis of organic solidarity as well as the innovative method of analyzing both through respective legal systems remains a significant contribution. Thus, we must as social scientists develop a method of separating and retaining the ideas that are valuable from those that we might wish never existed.
References
Durkheim, Emile. 1933. 1984. “The Division of Labor in Society” The Free Press. New York NY
Feagin, Joe and Feagin, Clairece. 1996. “Racial and Ethnic Relations” Fifth Edition. Prentice Hall. Upper Saddle, New Jersey.
Interesting info on Charles Darwin and social darwinism: http://www.racismreview.com/blog/2009/02/12/charles-darwin-did-he-help-create-scientific-racism/
Sunday, February 15, 2009
On Spencer
On Spencer
Isaac Christiansen
First and foremost, before analyzing Spencer’s points on "The Boer War", his connection between the imperialism and slavery, and how empire enslaves the empire (by tying him to the ‘responsibilities’ of domination, or any other matter, it must be said that the attempt of the ‘survival of the fittest’ to justify disenfranchisement of racial groups and the use of social Darwinist theory as groundwork for scientific racism- remains a historical repugnancy. Spencer’s key adjustment to Darwin’s work on evolution, was that it had an endpoint, or a goal- and that those with more had more because they were more 'fit. This led the way- when applied to society, to saying that those on top deserved to be there because they were more fit and more evolved; the perfect defense for an execrable status quo (Wikipedia 2009).
A key part in Herbert Spencer’s analogy between society and biological organism, and one that deserves to be separated conceptually from the negatives inherent in social Darwinist intellectual poverty, relates to the concept of mutual dependence. “And when, in a society we see that the workers in iron stop if the miners do not supply the materials; the makers of clothes cannot carry on their business in the absence of those who spin and weave textile fabrics; that the manufacturing community will cease to act unless the food producing and food-distributing agencies are acting; that the controlling powers, governments, bureaux, judicial officers, police, must fail to keep order when the necessaries of life are not supplied to them by the parts kept in order; we are obliged to say that this mutual dependence of parts is similarly rigorous” (Spencer 1916).
This is all the more reason, for him to appreciate the essential character of the any forms of work carried out within a society, and thus the poverty of the idea, that a small section of the population deserves the majority of societies product. For if all parts of society are mutually dependent as in an organism, how can one view as functional, when one organ of the body, the bourgeoisie, over-consumes and becomes obese, while the very parts of the organism which provide it sustenance, are emaciated? This is only possible, in the mind of Spencer, because this principle, is subordinate to that of “survival of the fittest’ and apologetic stance towards an exploitative and disenfranchising status quo, in spite of his more noble (but contradictory) opposition to state violence (for through violence and coercion the status quo is maintained).
By far Spencer’s most onerous contribution to the protection of the status quo and anti-Black racism was the concept that “the subordinate position of Blacks, for instance, simply reflected the immutable laws of nature” (Banks, 1997). DuBois contested Spencer’s position successfully, but it is unfortunate that the “credibility of science” under Spencer's name was lent to such an impoverished idea. It is also unfortunate that the rest of Spencer’s thought, suffers from a ‘guilt by association’ and although may contain valuable nuggets (as in his condemnation of Empire), are stained by racism.
References:
Banks, William. (1997). “Black intellectuals: Race and responsibility in American Life” W.W. Norton and Company. New York NY.
Spencer, Herbert (1916). “The Principles of Sociology, In Three Volumes” Vol 1. D. Appleton and Company New York and London.
Wikipedia. (2009) “Herbert Spencer” Accessed February 15, 2009 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Herbert_Spencer#Social_Darwinism
Isaac Christiansen
First and foremost, before analyzing Spencer’s points on "The Boer War", his connection between the imperialism and slavery, and how empire enslaves the empire (by tying him to the ‘responsibilities’ of domination, or any other matter, it must be said that the attempt of the ‘survival of the fittest’ to justify disenfranchisement of racial groups and the use of social Darwinist theory as groundwork for scientific racism- remains a historical repugnancy. Spencer’s key adjustment to Darwin’s work on evolution, was that it had an endpoint, or a goal- and that those with more had more because they were more 'fit. This led the way- when applied to society, to saying that those on top deserved to be there because they were more fit and more evolved; the perfect defense for an execrable status quo (Wikipedia 2009).
A key part in Herbert Spencer’s analogy between society and biological organism, and one that deserves to be separated conceptually from the negatives inherent in social Darwinist intellectual poverty, relates to the concept of mutual dependence. “And when, in a society we see that the workers in iron stop if the miners do not supply the materials; the makers of clothes cannot carry on their business in the absence of those who spin and weave textile fabrics; that the manufacturing community will cease to act unless the food producing and food-distributing agencies are acting; that the controlling powers, governments, bureaux, judicial officers, police, must fail to keep order when the necessaries of life are not supplied to them by the parts kept in order; we are obliged to say that this mutual dependence of parts is similarly rigorous” (Spencer 1916).
This is all the more reason, for him to appreciate the essential character of the any forms of work carried out within a society, and thus the poverty of the idea, that a small section of the population deserves the majority of societies product. For if all parts of society are mutually dependent as in an organism, how can one view as functional, when one organ of the body, the bourgeoisie, over-consumes and becomes obese, while the very parts of the organism which provide it sustenance, are emaciated? This is only possible, in the mind of Spencer, because this principle, is subordinate to that of “survival of the fittest’ and apologetic stance towards an exploitative and disenfranchising status quo, in spite of his more noble (but contradictory) opposition to state violence (for through violence and coercion the status quo is maintained).
By far Spencer’s most onerous contribution to the protection of the status quo and anti-Black racism was the concept that “the subordinate position of Blacks, for instance, simply reflected the immutable laws of nature” (Banks, 1997). DuBois contested Spencer’s position successfully, but it is unfortunate that the “credibility of science” under Spencer's name was lent to such an impoverished idea. It is also unfortunate that the rest of Spencer’s thought, suffers from a ‘guilt by association’ and although may contain valuable nuggets (as in his condemnation of Empire), are stained by racism.
References:
Banks, William. (1997). “Black intellectuals: Race and responsibility in American Life” W.W. Norton and Company. New York NY.
Spencer, Herbert (1916). “The Principles of Sociology, In Three Volumes” Vol 1. D. Appleton and Company New York and London.
Wikipedia. (2009) “Herbert Spencer” Accessed February 15, 2009 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Herbert_Spencer#Social_Darwinism
Saturday, February 14, 2009
Mores
Mores
In "Folkways" Sumner presents the case that social mores, while traditionally thought of as setting the limits for and ensuring acceptable behavior are exposed within the historical record of upholding torture, revenge and public executions. Provided that a particular act occurred within a given social context, even the worst excesses of humanity were seen as appropriate for punishing petty crime, or exacting revenge on defeated opponents. Sumner points out that the mores sanctioned the existence of brothels, under the rationalization that it provided a necessary outlet for society, and if people were unable to satisfy their desires through that outlet than worse would result. Whatever the mores of a society are, they are reflections of a particular stage in society, and more than reason, have tended to be the method of determining the jurisdiction of ethics. Most telling however, is the degree to which issues of a sexual nature elicited more attention or astonishment from Sumner than those dealing with torture or killing. This reflects the cultural lens and mores with which Sumner examines the mores of others.
The chapter “Sacred Harlotry and Child Sacrifice” further investigates the social construction of ethics. In it, Sumner examines a practice of the Ewe, whose homeland was split by colonialism (Togo, Benin and northern Ghana), were famous in Africa for voodoo, however have one supreme deity known as Mawu, of having girls of 12 years old spend three years with a priest and once of pubescent age are married to God and become publicly available. It may also be of interest to know that the Ewe tribe has a very communal social structure (wikipedia, 2009). Sumner points out, that this practice developed not out of maliciousness or social welfare but “was regarded as conducive to welfare” (Sumner, 1906)
If harlotry existed in the open, it was thus condoned by mores, when, (usually after connection with sexual excess and disease) it was condemned by the mores it would cease to exist. The argument is essentially that man socially constructs his morality and ethics more reflective of economic and social realities than of idealistic ones, (with thus a potential to degrade into sheer moral relativism and a disappearance of categorical imperatives) at least to a far greater degree than many would like to think. Thus, religion is constructed around society’s mores and not vice-versa. Mores are endowed with the power to allow and disallow any given act.
References:
Sumner, William Graham. (1906). “Folkways.” The Atheneum Press. Gin and Company Proprietors. Boston.
Wikipedia. 2009. “Ewe People” accessed February 13, 2009 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ewe_people
In "Folkways" Sumner presents the case that social mores, while traditionally thought of as setting the limits for and ensuring acceptable behavior are exposed within the historical record of upholding torture, revenge and public executions. Provided that a particular act occurred within a given social context, even the worst excesses of humanity were seen as appropriate for punishing petty crime, or exacting revenge on defeated opponents. Sumner points out that the mores sanctioned the existence of brothels, under the rationalization that it provided a necessary outlet for society, and if people were unable to satisfy their desires through that outlet than worse would result. Whatever the mores of a society are, they are reflections of a particular stage in society, and more than reason, have tended to be the method of determining the jurisdiction of ethics. Most telling however, is the degree to which issues of a sexual nature elicited more attention or astonishment from Sumner than those dealing with torture or killing. This reflects the cultural lens and mores with which Sumner examines the mores of others.
The chapter “Sacred Harlotry and Child Sacrifice” further investigates the social construction of ethics. In it, Sumner examines a practice of the Ewe, whose homeland was split by colonialism (Togo, Benin and northern Ghana), were famous in Africa for voodoo, however have one supreme deity known as Mawu, of having girls of 12 years old spend three years with a priest and once of pubescent age are married to God and become publicly available. It may also be of interest to know that the Ewe tribe has a very communal social structure (wikipedia, 2009). Sumner points out, that this practice developed not out of maliciousness or social welfare but “was regarded as conducive to welfare” (Sumner, 1906)
If harlotry existed in the open, it was thus condoned by mores, when, (usually after connection with sexual excess and disease) it was condemned by the mores it would cease to exist. The argument is essentially that man socially constructs his morality and ethics more reflective of economic and social realities than of idealistic ones, (with thus a potential to degrade into sheer moral relativism and a disappearance of categorical imperatives) at least to a far greater degree than many would like to think. Thus, religion is constructed around society’s mores and not vice-versa. Mores are endowed with the power to allow and disallow any given act.
References:
Sumner, William Graham. (1906). “Folkways.” The Atheneum Press. Gin and Company Proprietors. Boston.
Wikipedia. 2009. “Ewe People” accessed February 13, 2009 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ewe_people
Tuesday, February 10, 2009
More posts coming
More posts will come next week as all of my productive powers have been used up this week.
Monday, February 2, 2009
On Social Power
The Nature of Social Power
Isaac Christiansen
Social power according to Curry et al. (2008) is “The ability to control the behavior of others against their will.” Although parsimonious it is necessary to expand on this definition. Social power occurs through the exercise of other forms of power such as persuasive power, legal power, traditional power and prestige, state power, and economic power. All of those forms of power can exercise influence over and with others. Within organizations we see power through the establishment of hierarchy. Some manifestations of power are spread over populations i.e. (union organizing, grassroots organizing,) while others tend to concentrate in fewer hands (i.e. capital, political power).
One characteristic of extreme social power is that of avoiding accountability for ones actions. One diaphanous example of the exercise of this aspect of social power (the power for a state to act with complete unaccountability) in a geo-political context was the refusal of the United States to acknowledge and comply with the International Court of Justice’s ruling in 1986 over serious violations of international law in Nicaragua (Wikipedia, 2009). The United States was committed these crimes, was convicted in an international court, proceeded to claim that the court had no jurisdiction, and after the court ruled that it did have jurisdiction- the US was able to still avoid the official sanctions. This does not mean that this came without a cost to the US. It did lose further respect (prestige) in the eyes of the international community, but the international community was not powerful enough to enforce its sentence.
Why did the US not lose prestige in the eyes of its own population? Marx answers this clearly. “The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas (Marx 1845; Tucker 1978). Thus because the ownership of the media is concentrated in the hands of the same basic class interests in whose name the repression of the Sandanista movement took place, the close links between government and corporations, it was not deemed in their interest to disseminate and/or draw attention to this information.
It is important to examine the socio-economic context when discussing social power. Under a capitalist context it is clear that those who own the means of production have power over those who own only their labor power, which they must sell to the capitalist to continue existing. This dynamic in a capitalist society, is what compels people to engage in “irksome” labor. We must therefore also examine power dialectally, together with its antonym. Marx covers the origins of capital and its accumulation well, which is- to a degree- also a history of an accumulation of a particular kind of social power.
Many people conceptualize money as power. This works only because of a society’s recognition of money as being the most valid mediator of exchange. Once this is a society’s assumption we can then appreciate Marx’s eloquence on the subject. “I am ugly, but I can buy for myself the most beautiful of women. Therefore I am not ugly because the effect of ugliness- its deterrent power- is nullified by money (Marx 1844; Tucker 1978).”
When we look at those who are powerless in this, and other similar systems of production, history demonstrates that power is not simply in the hands of who we tend to identify as the “powerful”. The impoverished masses may also wield power as they did in Haiti, under Toussaint L’Overture. The ability to organize against “powerful oppressing interests” is itself a form of power. Resistance is the exercise of social power to the degree that it prevents the ruling classes (or the Power Elite) to desist in its exploitation. There is thus a tugging back and forth between the two, as both attempt to exert influence.
Social power can be found in trade unions and lobbying groups, in nation states, and in tribal councils. Social power is found also within academia, within industry, within a single company, within small groups and within the family. However, I think that it is important to include within any definition of social power that it can also be power with as opposed to power against or power over. It is important to realize that virtually all of mans achievements are social achievements and that they are the product of collective efforts. Within a Marxist conceptualization it becomes possible to envision a society free (or much lessoned) of class antagonisms and one in which “power with” becomes predominant. Thus although the collective exercises social power above any single individual, both its fruits and its “irksome labor” will be shared in with greater or lesser equality.
References:
Marx, Karl [1844] 1978. “Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844” pp 66-125 in The Marx-Engels Reader, 2nd edition, edited by Robert C. Tucker New York W.W. Norton and Company.
Marx, Karl [1844] 1978. “The German Ideology” pp 146-200 in The Marx-Engels Reader, 2nd edition, edited by Robert C. Tucker New York W.W. Norton and Company.
Wikipedia “Nicaragua vs. United States” Accessed 02/02/2009 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicaragua_v._United_States
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Toussaint_L%27Ouverture
Isaac Christiansen
Social power according to Curry et al. (2008) is “The ability to control the behavior of others against their will.” Although parsimonious it is necessary to expand on this definition. Social power occurs through the exercise of other forms of power such as persuasive power, legal power, traditional power and prestige, state power, and economic power. All of those forms of power can exercise influence over and with others. Within organizations we see power through the establishment of hierarchy. Some manifestations of power are spread over populations i.e. (union organizing, grassroots organizing,) while others tend to concentrate in fewer hands (i.e. capital, political power).
One characteristic of extreme social power is that of avoiding accountability for ones actions. One diaphanous example of the exercise of this aspect of social power (the power for a state to act with complete unaccountability) in a geo-political context was the refusal of the United States to acknowledge and comply with the International Court of Justice’s ruling in 1986 over serious violations of international law in Nicaragua (Wikipedia, 2009). The United States was committed these crimes, was convicted in an international court, proceeded to claim that the court had no jurisdiction, and after the court ruled that it did have jurisdiction- the US was able to still avoid the official sanctions. This does not mean that this came without a cost to the US. It did lose further respect (prestige) in the eyes of the international community, but the international community was not powerful enough to enforce its sentence.
Why did the US not lose prestige in the eyes of its own population? Marx answers this clearly. “The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas (Marx 1845; Tucker 1978). Thus because the ownership of the media is concentrated in the hands of the same basic class interests in whose name the repression of the Sandanista movement took place, the close links between government and corporations, it was not deemed in their interest to disseminate and/or draw attention to this information.
It is important to examine the socio-economic context when discussing social power. Under a capitalist context it is clear that those who own the means of production have power over those who own only their labor power, which they must sell to the capitalist to continue existing. This dynamic in a capitalist society, is what compels people to engage in “irksome” labor. We must therefore also examine power dialectally, together with its antonym. Marx covers the origins of capital and its accumulation well, which is- to a degree- also a history of an accumulation of a particular kind of social power.
Many people conceptualize money as power. This works only because of a society’s recognition of money as being the most valid mediator of exchange. Once this is a society’s assumption we can then appreciate Marx’s eloquence on the subject. “I am ugly, but I can buy for myself the most beautiful of women. Therefore I am not ugly because the effect of ugliness- its deterrent power- is nullified by money (Marx 1844; Tucker 1978).”
When we look at those who are powerless in this, and other similar systems of production, history demonstrates that power is not simply in the hands of who we tend to identify as the “powerful”. The impoverished masses may also wield power as they did in Haiti, under Toussaint L’Overture. The ability to organize against “powerful oppressing interests” is itself a form of power. Resistance is the exercise of social power to the degree that it prevents the ruling classes (or the Power Elite) to desist in its exploitation. There is thus a tugging back and forth between the two, as both attempt to exert influence.
Social power can be found in trade unions and lobbying groups, in nation states, and in tribal councils. Social power is found also within academia, within industry, within a single company, within small groups and within the family. However, I think that it is important to include within any definition of social power that it can also be power with as opposed to power against or power over. It is important to realize that virtually all of mans achievements are social achievements and that they are the product of collective efforts. Within a Marxist conceptualization it becomes possible to envision a society free (or much lessoned) of class antagonisms and one in which “power with” becomes predominant. Thus although the collective exercises social power above any single individual, both its fruits and its “irksome labor” will be shared in with greater or lesser equality.
References:
Marx, Karl [1844] 1978. “Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844” pp 66-125 in The Marx-Engels Reader, 2nd edition, edited by Robert C. Tucker New York W.W. Norton and Company.
Marx, Karl [1844] 1978. “The German Ideology” pp 146-200 in The Marx-Engels Reader, 2nd edition, edited by Robert C. Tucker New York W.W. Norton and Company.
Wikipedia “Nicaragua vs. United States” Accessed 02/02/2009 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicaragua_v._United_States
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Toussaint_L%27Ouverture
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